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I INTRODUCTION 
The Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) is now an integral part of the overall World Trade 
Organization ' s (WTO) regime. It sets up minimum standards of 
intellectual property protection to which all WTO members must 
adhere. It also brings the concept of intellectual property within the 
scope of multilateral trade negotiations, describing it as inherently 
linked with trade, due to its potential to become a barrier to trade 
between nations. 
To comply with TRIPS, states must provide detailed enforcement 
procedures under their domestic laws. Also, new recourse to GATT 
dispute resolution mechanisms increases the likelihood that actions will 
be lodged against states. Altogether, intellectual property has become 
actionable, enforceable and hannonised. 
There is a fundamental problem with the imposition of one universal 
standard for the protection of intellectual property, however: member 
states who are at less advanced stages of scientific and economic 
development are unlikely to benefit from the new TRIPS regime, as 
they lack the legal and technical infrastructures necessary to make it 
profitable, or even desirable to put laws protecting intellectual property 
into place. 
In addition, many nations lack a tradition of intellectual property 
protection, due to their different perceptions of intangible goods, or 
even more fundamentally, their different perceptions of the nature of 
property and ownership . To impose a property regime which has been 
based solely on the jurispn1dence of western, industrialised societies on 
these states is thus arguably counterproductive, and has the potential to 
result in a basic lack of philosophic commitment to the new TRIPS 
scheme. 
This paper will look at whether or not the TRIPS Agreement is 
fundamentally incompatible with the notions of ' inte11ectual property' 
and economic and development needs of many non-industrialised 
countries. It will do so in relation to the law of patents in the 
biotechnical and pharmaceutical fields , as arguably, these are the sorts 
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of products that are most valuable to the health and well-being of the 
citizens of developing countries. 
II BASIC PATENT LAW 
A patent gives its owner the right to a ' limited monopoly' - the right for 
a certain period of time, ( once set individually by states, now 
hannonized by TRIPS1) to detennine who, if anyone, can make, use or 
sell the item or process in question. Once this time has elapsed, the 
infonnation contained in the patent enters the public domain~ 
A 'disclosure ' requirement entitles the public to a complete description 
of the invention or process, immediately following the grant of the 
patent. This condition is contained in Article 29 of TRIPS, and together 
with the time limit placed on the inventor' s exclusive use of the 
patented product, ensures that the pool of infonnation available to the 
public is increasing, as is the dissemination of scientific infonnation. 
The Requirements for the Grant of a Patent 
Under article 27(1) of TRIPS, there are three technical requirements 
that must be met before a patent will be granted: 
1. New. A patent will not be granted for an item or process that is 
already known and used, or that is already patented. 
2. Involves an inventive step . An item or process must deviate 
enough from common practices so as not to be self-evident. 
3. Capable of industrial application . The invention must be useable, 
serve an intended purpose, and have some minimum level of 
social benefit. 3 
1 A patent monopoly lasts for 20 years, see TRIPS, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). 
2 AE Carroll "Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnlogy and the Global Impact of 
United States Patent Law" (1995) 44 Am. UL Kev. 2433 , 2444. 
3 MS Greenfield "Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science Struggling with the Patent 
Law" ( 1992) 44 Stanford L. Rev. 1051 , 1061. 
3 
Article 27(1)4 requires the latter two tenns be interpreted identically to 
the terms 'non-obviousness' and 'useful' respectively, which are the 
tenns used in Title 35 of the United States Code, the codified 
intellectual property law of America. Therefore, when these terms need 
to be clarified further, it will probably be useful to look at American 
law. 5 
Patent law is designed to intensify technological competition. If 
companies are trying to develop the same product at the same time, 
each wants to be first, as only the first to patent the product will have 
the right to use it, even though both may have expended similar 
amounts of time, money and labour in the development of the product. 
The fact that only one of them gets the patent however, does not stop 
the other from developing a better product later, so that their research 
is not necessarily in vain. 
III BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PHARMACEUTICAL ISSUES IN 
PATENT LAW 
The question whether patents should be available for natural 
substances often used in the production of both biotechnical and 
phannaceutical products is subject to great debate . The general rule is 
understood to be that you cam1ot patent nature, unless you can show 
that your invention is an "application of [a] law of nature to a new and 
useful end".6 Single natural products are not patentable two or more 
natural substances must be combined before a patent will be granted: 
The discovery that a natural product has a previously unknown effect 
will not suffice for a patent grant, as the patent regime is designed to 
encourage the development of new products and processes.8 
4 TRIPS Agreement, above nl , 94, at footnote 5. 
5 This is also an indication that the concepts of intellectual property that have been 
incorporated into TRIPS have been transplanted from the West, with little or no imput 
from societies with alternative intellectual property traditions. This will be discussed in 
greater detail below. 
6 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v Kato Inoculant Co. (1948) 333 US 127, 130. 
' See 35 U.S.C. section 101 (1988) . Also Dennis v Pitner 106 F.2d 142, 151 (7th Cir. 
1939), 308 us 606 (1939) . 
8 Le Roy v Tatham (1852) 55 US (14 How.) 156, 177. 
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There are two ways to avoid the natural products exception in patent 
law, however:9 
1. Develop a method to synthetically produce the compound. Although 
the product will not be patentable, the new process used to obtain it 
will . However, a synthetic product, slightly different from its natural 
counterpart but retaining the beneficial properties of the natural 
product, can be patented.10 
2. If the nah1ral product can be purified, and this purification results in 
"unexpected properties" which are beneficial to society in general, then 
the purified substance can be patented.11 
Should natural products be treated differently? If the patent system is 
designed to encourage the introduction of new products, is it wise to 
exclude natural products? 
A Biotechnology 
Biotechnology includes "any technique that uses living organisms to 
make or modify products, to improve plants or animals, or to develop 
micro-organisms for specific uses".12 The majority of research being 
done on human cells and tissues utilizes three technologies: 
1. tissue and culture technology; 
2. hybridoma technology, that is, the creation of hybrid cells 
through the fusion of two types of cells; and 
3. recombinant DNA technology, also known as genetic 
engineering.13 
9 C Edgar "Patenting Nature: GATT on a Hot Tin Roof ' (1994) 34 Washburn LJ 76, 86-
87 . 
10 M erck & Co. v Olin Mathieson Chem. C01p. 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958). 
" In Re Mertz 97 F.2d 599, 600 (C.C.P .A. 1938). 
12 L Daniels "Commercialization of Human Tissues: Has Biotechnology Created the Need 
for an Expanded Scope of Informed Consent?" (1990) 27 Cal. W.L. Rev 209, 210 . 
13 Above n 12, 211 . 
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Biotechnology will result in the development of new methods of 
medical treatment, such as gene therapy. Human gene therapy has been 
defined as "the deliberate administration of genetic material into a 
human patient with the intent of correcting a specific defect" i
4 
In biotechnical research, it is often unclear exactly what is, and is not, 
patentable. ' Inventions ' that are not patentable are laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.
15 To be patentable, an item 
has to be new, and naturally-occurring organisms do not meet this test, 
their structure must be manipulated and changed in some way. Items 
that have received patents include sexually and asexually reproduced 
plants; substances which occur in nature in an impure fonn and which 
have been isolated and purified by the patentee; and genetically made 
bacteria. 16 
The requirement by TRIPS that the applicant must demonstrate the 
usefulness of his or her invention creates two problems. Firstly, if 
technological problems remain to be solved before the discovery can 
be put to use, it may not be patentable; and secondly, an invention with 
no demonstrated 'utility ' may not be patented, however interesting and 
significant it may be to research scientists.
17 
In domestic intellectual property regimes this has been a continuing 
problem. For example, when the Human Genome Project in America 
filed for over two thousand patents on fragmented gene sequences, the 
applications were rejected by the US Patents and Trademarks Office 
because in most cases the Project did not know what these sequences 
could be used for . This was in keeping with an earlier decision of the 
US Supreme Court, which held that granting a patent to an item with 
no known utility "may confer power [to the inventor] to block off 
whole areas of scientific development."
18 
14 United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Human Gene Therapy 
(Washington, D.C. : Office of Technology Assessment, 1984) . 
15 See for example Diamond v Chakrabarty (1980) 447 U.S . 303, 309-310. 
16 See Parke-Davis & Co v H.K. Mulford Co. 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S .D.N.Y. 1911). 
17 RS Eisenberg " Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology 
Research" (1987) 97 Yale LJ 177, 186. 
18 Brenner v Manson (1966) 383 U.S . 51 9, 534. 
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Are biotechnical products different? 
Should biotechnological inventions be patentable? Proponents argue 
that once the traditional criteria of patentability have been met patents 
should be available for biotechnology inventions.19 Morality does not 
properly belong as a consideration in patent law. Technology is neither 
moral nor itmnoral, moral judgements can only be attached to what 
people do with a new product or process. Additionally, the concept of 
morality is too subjective, differit1g between societies, even within 
societies, and over titne . The role of the patent system is to promote 
technology, not regulate it. 
The response of those opposed to the patenting of biotechnologically 
produced products focuses on many aspects of the it1dustry. They are 
concerned about experitnentation on anitnals because of the pain 
caused to such anitnals, and uncertainty as to where such experiments 
might lead.2° There are also objections to the idea that the owner of a 
patent may ' own life ' and fear that species integrity may be 
ditninished. Animals are viewed as possessing the right not to have 
their species integrity destroyed by the interchanging of their genetic 
material. If species integrity is compromised, the natural order will be 
broken down into an assortment of artificial organisms.2 1 
The grant of patents on living matter has always been controversial. 
This doubt has existed in many jurisdictions and has been founded on 
several grounds .22 Before 1970 it was widely accepted that only 
primitive forms of life, such as yeasts23 and bacteria could be 
patented.24 
19 P Culbert "Biotechnology Inventions and the Morality Exclusion in Patent Law" LLM 
Research Paper (LAWS 546) (Law Faculty, Victoria University of Wellington, 1994 ), 10. 
20 See R Dresser "Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life" (1988) 28 
Jurimetrics J. 399. 
~
1 Above n19, 12. 
22 See R Nott "Patent Protection for Plants and Animals" [1992] 3 EIPR 79; and lli 
Burton "Patenting Life" (1991) 264 Scientific American 18. 
23For example, in 1873, Louis Pasteur was granted US Patent No. 141 072 for a purified 
strain of yeast . 
24 Above nl 9, 29. 
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Must 'morality' be considered when dealing with the patent protection 
of biotechnology? 
Morality is a consideration that the TRIPS Agreement deals with in 
relation to all products. Article 27(2) provides that members may 
exclude from patentability inventions, when this is necessary to protect 
ordre pubbc or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided 
that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by domestic law . 
These terms are taken from various intellech1al property Conventions, 
including the European Patent Convention .2 5 The Guidelines for the 
EPC26 state that the purpose of these exclusions is to prevent the 
patenting of inventions likely to induce public disorder or riot, or to 
lead to generally offensive behavior. The test used is "whether it is 
probable that the general public would regard the invention as so 
abhorrent that the grant of patent rights would be inconceivable" . The 
example used to illustrate this concept is a letter bomb. 
Although there has typically been much debate over the morality of 
patenting human genetic material, such applications have been allowed, 
not only in countries where there is no morality criteria, like the US, 
but also within the EC, as long as all the standard requirements for 
patentability are satisfied. 
For example, the morality criterion was considered in the application 
for a European patent for the Harvard Onco-mouse . The mouse was a 
transgenic animal, where a gene from one animal has been inserted into 
another. Transgenic animals have many potential uses, including the 
production of medicines, as research tools, or as farm animals .27 The 
mouse had a cancer-causing gene (an ' oncogene' ) inserted into its 
genetic structure which caused it to develop cancers within a few 
25 EPC, article 53(a) . The European Union has attempted to incorporate moral values into 
its patent system, while the US has refused to do so. 
26 European Patent Office Guidelines C-IV, 3. 1-3.3. 
27 Above n 19, 5. 
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months of its birth. It was used by research facilities investigating the 
causes and treatment of human cancer. 
The European Patents Office initially rejected the application for a 
patent on the Harvard Onco-mouse .28 However, on appeal to the 
Technical Board of Appeal, this decision was set aside and refered to 
the Examining Division29 which applied the morality test. The 
Examining Division looked at competing public interest considerations, 
and held that in the long run the invention would reduce animal 
suffering as fewer animals would be needed for conventional testing 
and research. Therefore the invention was not contrary to 53(a). The 
benefit the public received from this invention outweighed the risk to 
the environment and the hann to the animal itself. 
Issues of morality are not necessarily the same as natural rights issues. 
Morality does not relate to indigenous conceptions of whether or not 
there actually is any sort of property right in intangible goods, but more 
to describing the scope of products/processes in which intellectual 
property rights are recognized. The public interest considered is not the 
' general public interest' , if this was the case, in many developing 
countries public interest would prohibit the grant of intellectual 
property rights in many types of goods where it is widely accepted in 
developed nations that these goods will receive patents. 
Opposition to the grant of patents in transgenic animals such as the 
Harvard Onco-mouse, has been lodged on many different grounds. A 
wide range of moral concen1s are represented: the Technical Board of 
Appeal failed to sufficiently consider the suffering of the animaP0 ( a 
morality presumably based on the premise that animals should not 
suffer in order that humans should benefit); the Board overrated the 
benefit of the animal; that the Board underrated the environmental 
risks, for example the possibility that an Onco-dog could escape and 
breed with other nonnal dogs (to prevent wild packs of dogs roaming 
Europe, but more importantly, to preserve ' genetic integrity' );and 
28 OJ EPO 1989, 451 . 
29 Tl 9/90, Harvard Onco-mouse, OJ EPO 1990, 476. 
30 This argument was arguably strengthened by the inclusion in the patent application of an 
Onco-chimpanzee. 
I ,. 
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finally the balancing test was not suitable to determine whether the 
invention could be patented. If an invention was inherently immoral, it 
could not be made moral simply because it benefitted society. 
This raises a fundamental question about the nature of morality- is 
something moral if it can be justified on a practical basis, or is a 
product 'moral' only if it is not inherently wrong? 
Other complaints about the Board's decision related to the argument 
that the patenting of a human oncogene and of living matter was an 
affront to the dignity of the human race. Arguments were made about 
the unknown risks of genetic engineering. 
The opposition to the Harvard Onco-mouse patent eventually resulted 
in an emergency motion in the European Parliament calling for the 
revocation of this patent by the EPO. This resolution was carried by a 
majority of 178 to 19 (with 27 abstentions) and declared the "resolute 
opposition" of the Parliament to the patent.3 1 
B Pharmaceuhcals 
The distinction between inventions in the fields of phannaceuticals and 
biotechnology is very fine. 
Pharmaceutical patents are a highly political issue, as a very large 
number of extremely poor people in developing countries view their 
patentability not as merely an inteJlechial property issue, but as a social 
equity issue. 
Although phannaceutical companies dislike being singled out and 
stress that their industry has just as much right to patent protection as 
any other, in the pre-TRIPS era pharmaceuticals were the products 
( and processes) most frequently denied patent protection on a world-
wide basis. In addition to few, or poor intellectual property regulations 
protecting phannaceuticals, there was a tendency in developing 
countries to have extremely broad compulsory licensing provisions. If 
an invention was not worked in that particular country within a 
31 Above nl9, 44 . 
• 
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specified length of time, an abuse of the patent system was assumed, 
and the invention was made available to others under a compulsory 
licence. 32 
The concept of compulsory licensing was developed at the end of the 
last century, and the standard term of three to four years was 
established in the Paris Convention. This was a practicable length of 
time in the 1880' s when most inventions only took around three years 
to develop and market. New technological products now take much 
longer to produce, rendering the standard term unreasonably short? 
IV WHY IS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AN INTERNATIONAL 
ISSUE? 
Perhaps the initial question should be: Why should the GATT/WTO be 
used to obtain a single global standard for intellectual property? Does 
intellectual property in fact have trade-related aspects? Intellectual 
property has traditionally been seen as territorial, a matter for the 
domestic policy of individual states. Its inclusion within the ambit of 
the WTO has made intellectual property part of international trade 
relations. 
A The Development of Intellectual Property into an International Issue 
Until the 1970's, intellectual property was not even seen as an 
important academic topic of discussion.34 By the end of the decade, 
however, this had begun to change, primarily due to the economic 
analysis that was beginning to be applied to intellectual property law. It 
was not until the 1980' s that the inten1ational implications of 
intellectual property were realised. This was mainly due to the growing 
awareness of the importance of intellectual property to the economies 
of the world's most technologically advanced, (and powerful), nations. 
32 RM Sherwood "Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry" (1993) 8 Fla J. Int ' I L 
255 , 257. 
33 Above n32, 258 . 
34 WP Alford "How Theory Does -And Does Not- Matter: American Approaches to 
Intellectual Property Law in East Asia" (1994) UCLA Pac. Basin LJ 8, 9. 
• 
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The vulnerabilty of new industries to piracy 
The increasing importance of intellectual property was primarily due to 
the transfonnation of industrial economies, which were becoming more 
and more dependent on the revenue produced by knowledge-intensive 
industries, such as biotechnology and phannaceuticals. These 
industries are particularly susceptible to piracy, and rely heavily on 
intellectual property laws for protection. The limited monopoly right 
granted by patent laws was indispensible for the generation of new 
capital and the maintenance of an international competitive edge. The 
inclusion of intellectual property within the international trading regime 
is a reflection of the vulnerability of information-based economies to 
the demands of the global market for pirated products.35 
According to industrialised nations, it is this very global market that 
they need for their new high-technology products to become profitable. 
The domestic markets of developed countries by themselves, although 
providing the security of inteUectual property protection, may not be 
sufficient to recoup the enonnous research and development costs in 
the new infonnation-intensive industries. 
However, increasing demand for available consumer goods coupled 
with an inability or unwillingness to pay the prices of the developed 
world made piracy an attractive economic option. There was also a 
strong desire within most developing countries to promote their own 
industries, and a lack of intellectual property protection was seen as 
one way in which to give their citizens a head start.36 
2 Technological changes were also making piracy more prevalent. 
Technological developments in many developing countries meant that 
the copying of products was often much easier than before. In India, 
for example, the withdrawal of patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products facilitated the development of one of the most highly 
35RL Gana "Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications of the 
Internationalization oflntellectual Property" (1995) 24 Denv. J Int'l L & Pol 'y 109, 119. 
36 RM Gadbaw "Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or Marriage of 
Convenience?" (1989) 22 Vand . J Transnat'I L 223 , 227 . 
I 
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competitive phannaceutical markets in the world.37 The initial 
development of the Indian pharmaceuticals industry was facilitated by 
Indian nationals who had been involved with foreign phannaceutical 
companies working in India. The new industry was essentially copied 
products previously made by foreigners. 
3 The American trade deficit 
4 
One of the most important factors that initially connected intellectual 
property with trade issues was the growth in the American trade deficit 
in the mid 1980's.38 The trade deficit could be explained, so many 
technological industry groups claimed, by the unlawful use of 
intellectual property, primarily by lesser developed nations. The 
argument was made that if the consumers of intellectual goods paid 
retail prices, to the 'owners' of the intellectual property rights to those 
goods, then the extra revenue generated in this way would eliminate 
much of the deficit. 
Many countries were changing their intellectual property laws 
Another reason why intellechial property issues emerged at this 
particular point in time was that the intellectual property laws of many 
countries were changing. Until the 1970's, the patent laws of most 
third world nations tended to be similar to those of their fonner 
colonial n1lers. In the 1970's, developing countries were becoming 
increasingly concen1ed with the high costs of many technological 
products, especially pharmaceuticals, which caused many of them to 
change their patent laws. The new laws of Brazil, Columbia, Ecquador 
and India completely abolished patents granted on pharmaceutical 
products. 39 
3
' See below for a more extensive look at the Indian pharmaceuticals industry. 
38 Above n34, 12. 
39 Above n9, 81. The example of the Indian patent system will be discussed in greater 
detail below. 
• • 
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The Consequences 
By the end of the 1980' s, the link between intellectual property and 
trade had become an important element of American public policy. The 
Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 created Special 301 , which requires the 
US Trade Representitive to make a list of what he or she decides are 
offences committed against American intellectual property, and to 
initiate actions -potentially in contravention to US obligations under the 
GATT, and certainly contrary to its spirit- against the offenders. It was 
essentially statutory authority for the American government to use 
trade measures as leverage to acheive minimum intellectual property 
protection standards world-wide.40 
Both the Bush and Clinton administrations tun1ed intellectual property 
into one of the central objectives of US foreign policy.4 1 In a 1983 
address to the American public, President Reagan promised to maintain 
his country' s technological superiority into the next century~2 The 
Democratic Party responded by drawing attention to the 'need' to 
promote competitiveness through a stronger focus on research and 
development. At this stage, neither political party was quite aware of 
how to obtain these objectives. The industrial sector, however, was 
quite willing to step in and give them advice.43 This illustrates how 
early interest in the intellectual property aspects of international trade 
was generated principally by the public sector, whereas in the 1980' s 
impetus shifted to the huge technology-industry lobby. The US, 
followed by many other industrialised countries, changed its trade laws 
to classify the intellectual property protection laws of other countries as 
'defective.' These laws were seen to constitute a type of unfair trade 
practice, being non-tariff barriers to trade,44 which had significant 
effects on trade in technological and knowledge-intensive products. 
40 Above n36, 224. 
41 Above n34, 14. 
42 Above n36, 234. 
43 Above n36, 235 . 
44 G Garcia "Economic Development and the Course of Intellectual Property Protection in 
Mexico" (1992) 27 Tex. Int ' l LJ 701 , 703. 
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Eventually, the American strategy of making trade concessions depend 
on the availability of intellectual property protection in the state 
concerned, had to deal with the fact that it was incompatible with the 
GA.TT. The GA.TT contains only limited reference to intellectual 
property issues, illustrating the relative non-importance of intellectual 
property rights as an inten1ational matter in the early 1970' s~5 Prior to 
the introduction of TRIPS, when the protection of intellectual property 
rights was not considered to be part of the obligations imposed on 
members by the GA.TT, it could not be imposed on unwilling nations . 
The only possible argument that the United States could have used in 
their defence was that a lack of intellectual property protection laws in 
a given state could be brought up as an international trading issue under 
the GA.TT through Article XXIII, (which pennits a contracting party to 
claim a nullification or impairment of GA TT rights as a result of either 
a violation of the GA.TT or any other measure that has the effect of 
nullifying or impairing rights gained during the GA. TT' s negotiating 
rounds). 
The above argument was never made, however, and it is unlikely that it 
would have been accepted even if it had, although this seems exactly 
the sort of situation that may have been envisaged when section XXIII 
was being drafted. The United States would have not have negotiated 
for the same concessions that it has in fact received, if it had been 
anticipated that the value of those concessions would be seriously 
undennined. GA.TT Panel decisions, however, suggest a reluctance to 
adopt such "broad, almost constitutional" arguments~6 
Prior to the Uruguay Round of Gatt Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
the US demanded that the Round should produce a code authorising 
trade sanctions in response to intellectual property violations. A code 
was necessary to establish that 'violations ' had in fact taken place, and 
therefore so was a single, universal standard of intellectual property 
protection. Many nations complained, it was widely felt that such a 
step would diminish the authority of existing international bodies that 
dealt with intellectual property issues, like WIPO and UNESCO. 
45 Above n36, 230. 
46 Above n36, 232. 
15 
Concerns were also raised that the inclusion of intellectual property as 
an international trade issue would divert GATT from its traditional 
focus, and that intellectual property was not necessarily consistent with 
the basic function of the GATT. 
C Intellectual Property 's Inclusion wUhin the International Trading 
Sphere has generally been Justified in Two Ways. -17 
1 The free-rider problem 
The lack of a single global standard to which all member countries are 
required to adhere is said to be an incentive for countries to give their 
own citizens the benefits of the international intellectual property 
system, while denying benefits to the nationals of other countries. 
2 The incentive problem 
A country that has not fully participated in the international system 
creates incentives amoung its own citizens to engage in activities that 
rely on the absence of intellectual property protection. As a result, 
industries develop that cannot operate if a patent protection scheme is 
in force, and thus an interest in avoiding intellectual property n1les is 
established.48 Of course, this argument assumes that it is in fact in 
these countries ' long tenn interests to participate in the international 
intellectual property system. 
V THE IMPACT OF TRIPS ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 
TRIPS is not the first international agreement to establish minimum 
standards of protection for intellectual property, however it does raise 
the level of required protection and provides more substantive rules as 
well as sanctions and procedures for enforcement. 
47 EW Kitch "The Patent Policy of Developing Countries" (1994) 13 UCLA Pac. Basin 
166, 178. 
48 Above n47, 178. 
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For the first time, an international convention exists which standardises 
the treatment of patents, copyright, trade-marks, goegraphical 
indications, industrial designs, topographies of integrated circuits and 
trade secrets. Prior to the Uruguay Round, the GATT dealt with trade 
in manufactured, tangible products. Since then, two new subject 
matters have been added to the scope of the international trading 
regime: intellectual property and trade in services. 
The TRIPS Agreement requires that WTO members establish 
particular forms of intellectual property protection as a condition of 
membership. Previously, involvement in multilateral trading 
relationships was not premised on intellectual property protection, 
countries' intellectual property objectives had to be accomplished 
through bilateral agreements and non-membership of the international 
intellectual property conventions did not necessarily result in political 
ostracism or the loss of trade benefits. The United States, for example, 
did not join the Ben1e Convention for many years, and suffered no ill 
effects.49 
Can the GATT accomodate the notion that the balance of trade 
concessions contains the requirement that GATT members respect 
minimum standards of intellectual property protection? The TRIPS 
Agreement at best prioritizes the issue of intellectual property, and at 
worst imposes a model assumed to be the ' right' fonn of intellectual 
property protection. 
A Previous Treatment of Intellectual Property in the International Arena 
Traditionally, intellectual property has been goven1ed by three main 
principles: 50 
1. Territorial protection; 
2. National treatment of foreign owners of intellectual 
property; and 
3. International minimum protection. 
49 Above n35 , 122. 
50 H Ullrich "TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition 
Policy" (1995) 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL' Y J. 153 , 157. 
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These principles are a reflection of the traditional importance of 
national sovereignty and open markets. 
l Territoriality 
The exclusive right of the owner of inte11ec:tual property to make use of 
or sell a patented product was limited to the country which had granted 
that right. If the owner wanted use that right in another state ' s territory, 
another patent application would have to be made to this new 
jurisdiction, as the formal and substantive niles governing the grant of 
patents varied from country to country. If an intellectual property 
owner had the right of exclusive usage in more than one country, it was 
likely that the nature of the monopolies would differ considerably. 
The issue of territoriality underlines the fact that the acquisition, 
existence, maintenance, validity, scope, and termination of an exclusive 
right were public policy issues to be decided by individual 
governments, due to their effects on the flow of knowledge to their 
own citizens and the technological competition within a sovereign 
state ' s domestic marketplace .51 All countries have the right to regulate 
their intellectual property protection in relation to their own social and 
economic enviromnent, and to set their own domestic goals . 
Intellectual property was seen to be national by nature, and different 
standards and areas of protection were the nonn. What a country was 
likely to protect depended less on international or western nonns and 
more on the disadvantages/benefits a country felt would acme from 
protection. 
2 National treatment 
The principle of national treahnent meant simply that all foreign 
owners of intellectual property should be dealt with on an equal footing 
to national owners of intellectual property. Again, no minimum 
standards were necessarily imposed, but each state was free to 
determine the fonnal and substantive provisions of its intellectual 
property regime . If a particular state decided that no foreigners were to 
51 Above n50, 158. 
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be granted intellectual property rights within its territory, this was 
appropriate as long as the state ' s nationals did not receive any 
additional protections. 
The n1le of national treatment is the con1erstone of the Paris 
Convention,52 the Ben1e Convention53 and the Universal Copyright 
Convention .54 Due to the large membership of the Conventions55 and 
their wide ranging subject matter, the principle of national treatment 
has become fundamentally linked with intellectual property on an 
international level. 
National treatment is the antithesis of a system that is based on 
intellectual property ' rights,' as under this principle an inventor having 
a right to patent protection in one country should also be protected in 
another state. Therefore, previous regimes under the Berne and Paris 
Conventions were not based on natural rights but on utilitarian 
concen1s.56 
3 Minimum protection 
The pre-TRIPS Conventions claim to provide a minimum level of 
protection to the member states ' nationals . However, the extent to 
which the provisions of a Convention are ratified by individual states, 
as well as the extent to which nationals of these states can rely on them 
in their national courts, varies from country to country and from 
provision to provision. 
These principles meant that international enterprises dealing with 
intellectual property had to take into account the purely territoral effect 
of protection, the strength of the protection available and the 
52 See the Paris Convention for the Protection oflndustrial Property, article 2. 
53 The Berne Conventin for the Protection of Works of Literature and the Arts, article 5. 
54 Article II . 
55 At the beginning of 1995, there were 117 members of the Paris Convention and 105 
members of the Berne Convention. As the Conventions have been revised several times, 
states may adhere to different versions of them. See Above n50, 163 . 
56 AS Oddi "TRIPS - Natural Rights and a 'Polite Form of Economic Imperialism"' (1996) 
29 Vand. J Transnat'l L 415, 422. 
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effectiveness and cost of infringement litigation in a given country~7 
Selective strategies of filing, maintaining and enforcing national patents 
generally aim to defeat the competing pirate either directly in its home 
market, or in some of its major supply markets. These strategies are 
fonnulated with respect to the comparative interests and strengths of 
the owner of the intellectual property and of the competitor. 
Advantages of Using the GATT to Protect Intellectual Property 
One of the major problems with the pre-TRIPS system, at least 
according to the lobby of the industrialised nations, was that the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the major international 
institution dealing with intellectual protection, was incapable or 
unwilling to deal with the claims of countries who were heavily 
involved in the trade in information- technology, that the failure of 
developing nations to protect intellectual property infringed their 
trading rights. 
This unwillingness was blamed on the block voting power that 
developing countries could wield in WIPO, which lead to a stalemate 
between the two factions .58 
GATT was seen as a good venue, as it had the huge advantage of trade 
leverage as greater progress was felt to be attainable through the 
GATT because it had more fluid mechanisms for adopting new 
measures. GATT members had not yet formed inflexible blocs, mainly 
because the variety of economic interests differed according to which 
of the myriad of trade issues involved was the subject of GATT 
negotiation. 
The GATT' s dispute settlement process, while viewed as needing 
considerable improvement, is generally considered to be better than the 
voluntary WIPO system.59 Of the two inten1ational bodies that formerly 
governed intellectual property in the intenrntional arena, WIPO and 
57 Above n50, 169. 
58 Above n56, 425 . 
59 See General Accounting Office (GAO) International Trade: Strengthening World-Wide 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (1987) pp 36-37. See above n56, 425 . 
I 
I 
20 
UNESCO, neither had a fonnal dispute resolution mandate, and could 
not make law in a judicial sense. Only at the request of both parties 
could they become involved. The Conventions do not generally 
approach the matter of remedies for infringement or enforcement. The 
Paris Convention treats the granting of patents purely as a matter to be 
dealt with purely by the individual states themselves.60 
Although the Conventions do provide for some form of dispute 
settlement by arbitration,61 compliance with the n1les of the 
Conventions is primarily dependent on the self-interest of the member 
states. Although the majority of member states have accepted 
arbitration, this has generally not been practical because of the broad 
discretion member states have in implementing the Conventions ' 
niles .62 Whether or not the subject matter qualifies for Convention 
status and triggers international protection is detennined by the 
individual state itself, due to the lack of one standard, across the board 
definition for many different key concepts, for example, what 
constitutes an invention. 
C The System Under TRIPS 
New substantive rules for intellectual property protection are to be put 
into place by member states . TRIPS prescribes what must be protected, 
and how it is to be protected. Previous treaties and institutions dealing 
with intellectual property issues in the intenrntional arena, such as the 
Paris and Ben1e Conventions, laid down minimum standards of 
protection, but TRIPS also raises the floor and provides more 
substantive n1les as well as procedures for enforcements and 
sanctions. 63 
TRIPS requires that its members put into place an effective patent 
system for essentially all branches of technology .64 Article 28 sets forth 
60 Paris Convention, article 2, sections 3, 6, 12. 
61 Paris Convention, article 28, Berne Convention, article 33 . 
61 Above n50, 165 . 
63 Above n3 5, 121. 
64 TRIPS, above n 1, article 27: " Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 below, 
patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
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clearly defined patent rights, and establishes a new standardised tenn 
of 20 years of patent monopoly. Remedies for infringement include the 
availability of damages and injunctions.65 TRIPS shifts the burden of 
proof so that process patents can be more readily enforced than under 
the burden of proof n1les that are commonly in place in most domestic 
jurisdictions, where the 'defendent' has the burden to prove that the 
process to obtain an identical product is different from the patented 
process in question. This automatically puts the holder of an existing 
patent at an advantage .66 Each country must establish a reasonably 
effective enforcement regime for patents,67 and comply with Articles 1-
12 and 19 of the Paris Convention.68 
The conditions of the WTO are essentially substantive international 
'law' that members must follow as the result of the dispute resolution 
system that the WTO administers.69 The scope of the WTO's 
responsibility, its dispute settlement process, and the binding nature of 
its decisions, all set it apart from the previous Conventions. 
One of the key functions of the WTO is dispute resolution . The 
Council for TRIPS was set up under the Charter of the WTO to be 
responsible for monitoring the operation of the Agreement and to 
ensure that it was complied with by the contracting parties. Disputes 
arising under TRIPS are governed by the central dispute resolution 
process of the WT0.70 In contrast, WIPO's activities are limited to the 
coordination and promotion of intellectual property protection in 
member states. WIPO focuses on maintaining and increasing respect 
for intellectual property on a world wide scale, in order to further 
industrial and cultural development. TRIPS is an enforcement 
mechanism for a standard that has already been imposed, rather than a 
persuasive mechanism. 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application ... " 
65 TRIPS, above nl , articles 45 and 44. 
66 TRIPS, above nl , article 34. 
5
" TRIPS, above n 1, articles 41-43. 
68 TRIPS, above nl, article 2. 
69 GA TT at Article XXIII. 
70 TRIPS, above nl , article 64(1) . 
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D Disadvantages of the New System 
There are two major disadvantages to enforcing minimum standards of 
intellectual property using the threat of trade sanctions:71 
1. It is at odds with the general principles of the GATT, as it sanctions 
low levels of intellectual property protection regardless of whether 
such a low level of protection is the genuine cause of injury to the 
exporting state. On other issues, such as antidumping, the GATT 
requires an examination on a country by country and product by 
product basis, of the causes of the injury to the domestic industry 
involved. 
2. If domestic intellectual property is used, not to prevent piracy or 
free-riding, but more to prevent competition by low-cost competitors, 
TRIPS may bring discredit to the operation of inte11ectual property in 
general, as since its foundations are controversial in the first place, it 
risks being labeled protectionist by developing nations . 
Arguably, TRIPS' major effect will be in relation to products such as 
pharmaceuticals which have previously received special treatment in 
many countries. Not only have these products been exceptionally 
exempt from patent protection in many developing nations, they also 
receive different treatment from TRIPS. Although, depending on the 
nature of the state involved, a state may have a period of grace when 
the TRIPS Agreement does not apply, in which to establish the 
appropriate infrastructure needed to administer an inte11ectual property 
regime, it must be possible to grant patent protection for 
phannaceuticals and agricultural chemical products straight away.72 
7 1 
FK Beier & G Schricker GATTor WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of 
Jntel/ectua! Property (Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, 
Copyright and Competition Law, Munich, 1989), 132. 
72 
TRIPS, above n I, see articles 66 ( establishing a transitional period for developing 
country members) and 70(8)(1), (providing that members shall, for pharmaceutical and 
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E New Features of the TRIPS System 
In summary, protecting intellectual property within a trade paradigm 
establishes several new features of the inten1ational intellectual 
property system: 
1. It is now easier to monitor states' compliance with TRIPS ' 
requirements, through the institutional mechanisms of the WTO. 
Although WIPO set out minimum standards of intellectual 
property protection, it had no real enforcement mechanisms, or 
realJy even the ability to ensure that the sarre standards were 
being implemented by all states. 
2. The private rights of the individual intellectual property owner 
have essentially been transformed into rights upon which the 
state can act in the inten1ational arena. 
3. Countries who want to be part of the intenrntional trading system 
are required to enact domestic laws ensuring that they comply 
with TRIPS. 
4. TRIPS has created a truly global system of intellectual 
property. 73 
VI THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: THE 
WESTERN VIEW 
In Western societies, intellectual property protection is seen as existing 
to advance the development of scientific and other types of knowledge. 
This view centres around the conviction that a system should reward 
agricultural chemical products, provide as from the date of entry into force of the MTO a 
means by which applications for patents for these products can be filed) . 
73 Above n35, 123-124. 
LAW LIBRARY 
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creativity by granting limited74 monopolies over the use, possession 
and disposition of the object created. Inteilectual property is basically 
the incentive for creation. 
This is il1ustrated in the American Constitution, which sets out the 
justification of intellectual property protection.75 The Congress has the 
power to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts" 
through patents and copyrights. Not only the United States, but 
European nations based recognition of inteilectual property on the 
economic benefits provided to society as a whole. 
Although one objective was to reward the individual inventor, this 
justification was also originally designed to encourage innovation. The 
fame and honour awarded to the innovator were an incentive to others, 
who "would then apply their genius, would discover, and would build 
devices of great utility to [the] Colillnonwealth."76 The focus on 
inventors' rights came later, at the time of the development of natural 
rights theories, during the American and French revolutions. 
The prevailing Anglo-American view is that intellectual property laws 
are necessary prerequisites for innovation.77 It is not that creativity 
would not take place without the incentive that inteilectual property 
provides, but that creative activity would be minimal, and that as a 
result, the development of artistic thought and scientific knowledge 
would be adversely affected. 
The argument is that by defining the parameters for the use of scarce 
resources ( establishing the areas of human endeavour that society can 
most benefit from, that is, what wi11, and wi11 not be patentable subject 
matter) and assigning the associated rewards and costs (granting the 
right of exclusive monopoly), the prevailing system of property rights 
concentrates labour and research in the areas that will be the most 
useful. 
74 
Limited in that the monopoly right only exists for a specified, finite period of time. 
"
5 
U.S. CONST. Art. I, Section 8, Clause 8. 
76 
First general patent law, enacted in 1474, by the Venetian State. See above n2, 2444. 
77 Above n35, 126. 
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Since property rights define the behavioural norms for the assignment 
and use of resources, people are most likely to put effort into a project 
for which they will be rewarded. It is then possible to predict how 
differences in property rights affect economic activity78 Intellectual 
property laws are thus linked to economic development, and their 
absence leads to industrial stagnation, inefficient use of scarce 
resources, and technological backwardness . 
If the value of intellectual property law lies in the incentive provided, 
then society only benefits when patented products are actually induced 
by the patent system. That is, there must be a causal connection 
between the system and advancements in a society' s body of 
knowledge. 
Arguably, so-called ' revolutionary' inventions are the ones that are 
most dependent on the patent system. These are inventions that 
produce revolutionary changes in the patterns of public consumption or 
production .79 These inventions generally have an intennediate to high 
benefit-to-cost ratio, that is, they incur considerable investment and 
development costs, and nm a significant risk of failure . Examples 
include the airplane, antibiotics, television, tranquilisers and the 
telephone.80 
Inventions with a high benefit-to-cost ratio rely less on the incentives 
that the patent system offers, as they tend to be merely improvements 
on existing products, and so incur fewer research and development 
costs, and can depend on an already-established market and 
distribution system. The primary inducement for production of these 
products is the market itself 
The inducement justification of patents relys on the amount being 
gained by a society from the production of revolutionary inventions 
outweighing the costs of the administration and infrastructure required 
to operate the intellectual property system. It is important, when 
78 RT Rapp & RP Rozek "Benefits and Costs oflntellectual Property Protection in 
Developing Countries" (1990) 24 J ofWrld Trade 75, 77 . 
79 Above n56, 442 . 
80 Above n56, 442-3 . 
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determining this, to distinguish revolutionary inventions from products 
that would have been developed regardless of whether the intellectual 
property regime was in place. 
VII IS THIS PURPOSE REFLECTED IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT? 
The major problem with imposing one global intellectual property 
standard is that philosophical differences about the nature of 
intellectual property exist. Industrial countries see the right to "own" 
intellectual property as equivalent to rights over physical property. On 
the other hand, the attitude of developing countries reflects a 
development strategy based on making technology available to their 
own citizens at the lowest possible price.81 
The global standards introduced by TRIPS mean that new ways for 
understanding and justifying intellectual property rights will need to be 
found now that it is no longer just W estem countries that share the 
moral, religious heritage and economic environment in which these 
rights are implemented.82 TRIPS arguably rests on no solid theoretical 
or empirical basis whatsoever.83 Moral arguments do not figure 
strongly in the international discussion of the intellectual property 
issue. They have been de-emphasised to avoid the problem that not all 
cultures accept that there is such a thing as a 'natural right' of an 
inventor to intellectual property. But even by placing economic 
considerations in a central role, the supporters of TRIPS have left the 
incompatibilities of belief relating to the definitions and attributes of 
property unaddressed. 
A TRIPS Does Contain Assumptions About Rights 
Far from being universal, ideas of ownership contained in TRIPS 
reflect the moden1, Westen1 legal notions of property and the nature 
81 Above n44, 714. 
82 MA Hamilton "The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated and Overprotective" 
(1996) 29 Vand . J ofTransnat'l L. 613 , 614. 
83 "Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a Scholarly Debate" ( 1996) 29 
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 363, 370. 
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of human effort and appropriate rewards. TRIPS installs a universal 
intellectual property protection standard, and its requirements must be 
met despite the fact that these standards may be both incompatible 
with the cultural practices within many societies, and invalid under 
local law and custom. 
Intellectual property, like other forms of property that each society 
recognises, embodies rights values. The very selection of what to 
protect and the nature of the protection given, are shaped by what a 
society sees as its most fundamental values and needs. The economic 
incentive theory has dominated recent discourse on intellectual 
property, as has the utilitarian conception of patent laws. Typically, 
Western societies see the purpose of intellectual property regulation 
as the balancing of private reward and the encouragement of 
creativity with the benefit of public access to new information,84 at 
least within their domestic jurisdictions. International intellechial 
property is described primarily as a mechanism for redressing trade 
deficits and for maintaining 'fair' competition in global markets. 
This reflects the Western focus on individual rights, such as liberty, 
property, equality and the accumulation of capital. Westen1 
intellechial property theory is based on the assumption that individual 
rewards are a prerequisite for innovation, and that human behaviour is 
a series of responses to incentives.85 When faced with a choice, 
individuals will always take the option that maximises their own 
welfare. The granting of a limited monopoly right allows people to 
make welfare-maximising decisions without the fear of free-riders . 
The ultimate goal of the intellechtal property system is therefore to 
maximise benefits to society from the creation of additional 
inventions.86 Along the way an inventor's right to his or her creation 
became 'propertised.' 
An argument commonly used by developed nations to support the 
imposition of the universal TRIPS standard is that intellectual 
property laws are closely linked with economic development, growth 
84 Above n35, 112. 
85 Above n3 5, 116. 
86 Above n35 , 118. 
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and prosperity, and that failure to implement them will lead to 
inefficient use of scarce resources, economic stagnation and 
technological backwardness, in part due to the general 
discouragement of indigenous innovation.87 
This makes at least three assumptions that are not necessarily shared 
by all of the members of the WTO. Firstly, an assumption is made 
that human innovative labour is actually valuable. Secondly, society 
should aim to reward the products of innovation. Entitlement to 
reward is determined according to the attributes of the resulting 
product, effort in itself is not sufficient. Finally, to be valuable, 
products should be able to be commercially exploited.88 
If W esten1 utilitarian and economic justifications do not provide a 
strong enough basis for intellectual property protection,89 the 
imposition of a universal intellectual property scheme upon countries 
where these arguments do not stand up, must therefore be based on 
moral conceptions of property rights. The insistence upon world-
wide standards of intellectual property in itself, if it cannot be so 
justified, means that intellectual property is deemed to be of such 
importance that it has acquired natural rights aspects.90 
B Non-Western Views on Intellectual Property 
It is obvious that innovation does not only take place in countries that 
have a tradition of intellectual property protection . Every society at 
any stage of development invented, created and developed products 
necessary to sustain the life and well being of the society.91 Both 
mechanical and expressive innovation abound in any society. Things 
such as songs, dances, artistic designs and medicinal fonnulas were 
developed despite any ' lack' of intellectual property protection. 
Many societies have a differrent undersanding of 'authorship,' and 
therefore ownership, than is found in most Western cultures. In 
87 Above n35, 127. 
88 Above n82, 617. 
89 See below. 
90 Above n56, 426 . 
91 Above n35, 128. 
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relation to artistic works especially, the individual was not recognised 
as the source of the created work, and a claim to personal ownership 
would have been w1thinkable.92 
For example, in China, the 'new' was not traditionally admired 
merely because it was new, and copying was looked upon as a noble 
art. 93 The link made in American rhetoric between Chinese 
recognition of intellectual property rights, or the lack thereof, and its 
human rights record,94 reflects not necessarily that intellectual 
property rights are thought of in the same light as fundamental human 
rights, but the traditional Westen1 view that the holders of 'rights' are 
individuals, rather than any other larger entities. 
Norms governing the recognition of property rights in intangible 
goods tend to be based in the nature of the organisation of the 
particular state. Ancient Israel, for example, was governed under a 
theocracy, so that the primary purpose of property protection was 
ecclesiastical. The decision as to what type of goods were to be 
protected was made so that the sanctity and purity of certain 
processes and products could be preserved.95 
As well as differing in the fundamental purposes behind the patent 
sysem itself, the nature of the right in an intangible good, once 
recognised, is not necessarily the same in all societies. In many 
indigenous societies, the knowledge of traditional medicine that had 
been developed through a process of time and training was guarded 
by groups of specialists, rather than the originating individual. The 
' right' granted is therefore the right to participate in the group's 
collective knowledge, rather than the right to exclude others from 
benefitting from the new discovery. 
Developing countries often consider intellectual property and 
scientific knowledge in general to be the "common heritage of 
mankind," and therefore preventing access to such knowldge is 
9
~ See for example, many Native American Indian Tribes, and ancient Israel. Above n35, 
129-130. 
93 Above n82, 619. 
94 Above n82, 619. 
95 Above n35 , 130. 
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wrong, especially in areas of knowledge vital to pub1ic well-being 
such as medical information and innovation. Even if a developing 
nation does have some intellectual property laws, often it will exclude 
from protection subject matters it considers too important to be left to 
individual regulation, so that the public can have unrestricted access 
to them. Such was the case with India' s intellectual property laws, 
which excluded phanneceutical goods from patent protection.96 
C Presumptions Within the TRIPS Agreement 
In contrast, the Western view, enshrined in TRIPS, is that science and 
technology are the result of investment and labour, and therefore 
belong to the creators, and not to society in general. Property includes 
the right to exclude others from using your invention, and the right to 
dispose of property as one wishes . This right to exclude is imposed 
on the international system in TRIPS, which focuses on the right to: 
"prevent third parties not having [the inventor' s]. .consent 
from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, 
or importing for these purposes that product'm 
and; "where the subject matter of the patent is a process, to 
prevent third parties not having [the inventor' s] .. . consent 
from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: 
using, offering for sale, selling or importing for these 
purposes at least the product obtained directly by that 
process. "98 
Along with the Western traditional conception of property exclusivity 
is the central attribute of patent rights conferred by the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
As a result, TRIPS not only encourages innovation, but also puts into 
place one particular conception of property privileges, and enforces 
it across national boundaries . The Agreement makes the protection of 
96 See discussion below. 
9
" TRIPS, above nl , article 28(1)(a), "Rights Conferred ." 
98 TRIPS, above nl , article 28(l)(b). 
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intellectual goods in the forms and categories recognised in Western 
cultures, a mandatory requirement for nations within the multilateral 
trading system. The basis of the intenrntional economy has been re-
ordered, and countries must adopt this new rationale, or at least 
comply with it, in order to benefit from the new system.99 
Arguments that base the ' right' of a person to intellectual property 
based on their expended labour or discovery, not only relate to the 
utilitarian need to encourage innovation, but to arguments that base 
entitlement on higher principles, that is, natural law.100 There are two 
basic lines of reasoning tmderpinning the granting of the status of 
natural right to intellectual property. The first is that the creator has 
the right of "first occupancy," that the act of discovery or invention in 
itself gives rise to a moral entitlement to exclusive use. The second is 
that the person who expends the labour should be morally entitled to 
the fruits of that labour. 
Natural rights theories played a major rhetorical role in the strategy of 
W esten1 industrial groups trying to get their governments to put 
intellectual property onto the inten1ational trade agenda. 
Universalism, which the industrial lobby saw as the primary target of 
introducing intellectual property into the Uruguay Round 
Negotiations, is one of the fundamental characteristics of a nah1ral 
right. If the ability to exclude others from using your intellectual 
property is an entitlement, rather than a privilege granted by a 
particular intellectual property regime, that right should not be 
territorially limited because it does not arise from the positive law of 
any given sovereign, but from a ' higher order. ' The arbitrary fact of 
where the invention was created should therefore not affect the 
recognition of a nahlfal right. 
By insisting on one single standard for the whole of the global trading 
community, TRIPS is moving the recognition of intellectual property 
away from the tenns of a privilege granted by individual states where 
the grant can be limited in terms of subject matter, territory and 
99 Above n35, 120. 
100 Above n56, 427. 
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duration, to one where each individual state can focus more closely 
on the specific goals its intellectual property regime is designed to 
achieve. The lack of ability to tailor intellectual property systems to a 
country's particular needs seems more in line with a natural law 
concept of intellectual property than the economic, utilitarian 
justifications which are frequently put forward to justify the 
imposition of TRIPS. 
The Agreement contains two clauses which indicate at least some 
level of natural rights theory implicit within TRIPS. Article 27, 
Patentable Subject Matter, goes far beyond what many countries 
consider to be the proper subject of a patent grant. Aside from the 
exceptions in paragraphs two and three,101 members must provide 
intellectual property protection for any invention, whether processes 
or products, in all fields of technology.102 
Many nations, if they implement an intellectual property system, have 
exclusions on the nature of patentable subject matter in order to 
further government objectives and public policy. A 1988 WIPO study 
showed that the areas most commonly denied patent protection are 
phannaceutical products, animal varieties, plant varieties, food 
products, computer programmes, chemical products and 
pharmaceutical processes. 103 Although members may still deny 
patentability for animal and plant varieties,104 none of the other 
products or processes may be excluded from protection, not even to 
implement potentially vital public policy. 
101 "Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their 
territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or 
morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment. .. " Above nl , article 27(2) . "Members may also exclude 
from patentability: (a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans or animals; (b) plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals ... " article 27(3) . 
102 TRIPS, above nl , article 27(1) . 
103 See W.I .P.O., Existence, Scope and Form of Generally Internationally Acceped and 
Applied Standards/Norms for the Protection oflntellectual Property, WO/INF/29 Sept. , 
1988 GATT Document MTN. GNG/NG 11/W/24/Rev. 1. 
104 See above nl 7. TRIPS Article 27(2) and Article 27(3). 
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The broad, mandatory nature of Article 27 points more clearly to a 
natural rights theory of intellectual property than a utilitarian 
conception of it. It can be argued that Article 27 has a utilitarian 
basis, as individual countries may have made mistakes concerning the 
merits of their public policy, which have now been rectified by the 
international community. However, this argument is unlikely to be 
accepted by many developing countries as it is highly patronising and 
dependent upon the objectivity of those analysing the merits of 
different states' domestic policy. 105 
Another article that seems to embody a natural law conception of 
intellectual property is Article 33, which standardises the term of 
patents to a universal 20 year grant. Previously, most countries 
granted a shorter period of patent protection. Individual members are 
now excluded from establishing the term of protection on an 
instrumentalist basis according to the perceived value of a particular 
class of inventions.106 A unifonn term, irrespective of the impediment 
to individual members' public policy, fits better with natural rights 
theory than instrumentalist values. 
A section of TRIPS that seems not to be based on a natural law view 
of intellectual property rights, but on a utilitarian basis, is Article 70, 
Protection of Existing Subject Matter. Under paragraph 8 of the 
Article, all members must make available as of the date of entry into 
force of the Agreement. .. patent protection for pharmaceutical and 
agricultural chemical products commensurate with its obligations 
under Article 27 ... ". What is unusual about these two categories of 
products is that they must be protected immediately once the 
Agreement becomes applicable,107 whereas for all other protectable 
products and processes, the date protection is to be provided depends 
on the nature of the state involved. 
For other products, any developing country member is entitled to 
delay for an extra period of four years the date that they must begin to 
105 Above n56, 436. 
106 Above n56, 439. 
10"The Agreement is not obliged to be applied by its members before "the expiry of a 
general period of one year following the date of entry into force of the Agreement 
establishing the MTO (Multilateral Trade Organization)."TRIPS Article 65(1). 
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apply the Agreement. 108 Least-developed country members, "in view 
of their special needs and requirements, their economic, financial and 
administrative constraints, and their need for flexibilty to create a 
viable technological base", 109 do not need to comply with Article 27 
for a period of ten years from the date of the application of the 
Agreement. 
By excluding the right to a transitional period to pharmaceutical and 
agricultural chemical products, TRIPS implies that these products are 
of such importance that immediate protection must be implemented, 
even when the products were created prior to their protectability 
under the positive laws of certain members .11 0 In this way, the 
characteristic of universality, thought to be necessary for a natural 
right, is diminished, at least in respect of subject matter. For an 
entitlement theory to work, creation and labour should automatically 
give rise to the right of exclusivity, so that invention should always 
result in a patent, and the same rules should apply to all patents, 
regardless of subject matter. 
Therefore, Article 70 sits uneasily with Articles 27 and 33 . The 
differentiation of the nature of tl1e protection of pharmaceutical and 
agricultural chemical products suggests a utilitarian foundation , and 
tl1e assignment of differing levels of importance to different patent 
rights. This seems contrary to the main purpose of TRIPS, which is to 
standardise the inten1ational treatment of intellectual property. 
However, the distinction is easier to justify if it is assumed that 
TRIPS rests on a utilitarian basis . The important thing is that 
everyone treats things the same way, not that every single product is 
given identical protection. The different treatment of phannaceuticals 
and agricultural chemicals, especially taking into account the fact that 
flexibility is allowed in relation to the varying transitional periods 
given to developing and least-developed countries, suggests that 
universality, although important, is not necessarily the primary 
principle upon which TRIPS rests . 
108 TRIPS Article 65(2) . 
109 TRIPS Article 66. 
11 0 TRIPS Article 70(8)(ii). 
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Even though TRIPS itself may be designed on a utilitarian basis, by 
imposing a single standard upon the whole of the international trading 
community, it does effectively impose upon non-Westen1 countries 
the Western 'exclusivity/individual rights' conception of property that 
necessarily attaches to a regime that gives an individual, exclusive 
right over intangible goods. 
If this is true, putting into place intellectual property legislation in 
developing countries not sharing this perception of intellectual 
property will be more problematic than initially expected, as mere 
legislation caimot chai1ge attitudes oven1ight, ai1d developed countries 
cannot expect that institutions needed to implement such legislation 
will suddenly emerge .111 
It is important that there is some effort made to link intellechial 
property laws with social realities in developing countries, not only in 
relation to the different ways that a universal system will effect such 
countries economically, but so that the cultural differences which 
affect the understanding of what constih1tes property or what may 
rightly be subject to private ownership, must be taken into account.1 12 
Although fonnal compliance will result, in as far as the laws 
themselves are implemented, so will formal indifference to 
enforcement ai1d infrastn1cture. Changing the law will not necessarily 
chai1ge the way that the general public in developing nations, 
especially tl10se who live outside main centres, conduct themselves . 
The successful commodification of intellectual goods can only be 
achieved in a society which is based on this type of individualism. 
Until developing societies have reached a point where they have 
adopted the values that were once imposed on them, the international 
community may have to come to terms with a persistent level of 
piracy in the global marketplace.11 3 With the introduction of the 
TRIPS model of intellectual property, governments in developing 
111 Above n34, 17. 
111 Above n3 5, 11 5. 
113 Above n35 , 141 . 
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countries are faced with the difficult job of overturning their citizens ' 
conceptions of the nature of property, and of the nature of the 
individual ' s importance within society. Piracy will not be wiped out 
with the mere implementation of intellectual property laws. It must be 
remembered that intellectual property laws are not the cure-all that 
they are held up to be. There is still a significant incidence of piracy 
in such strongholds of intellectual property protection as the USA 
and Europe. 
VIII THE POSITION OF INDUSTRIALISED NATIONS 
It is undoubtedly advantageous for developed countries to paticipate 
in a global intellectual property regime. Their industries can exploit 
intellectual property rights that must be granted in the markets of the 
countries that belong to the international trading network. The 
question therefore is, what are the benefits of the newly imposed 
TRIPS system for developing nations? 
The arguments from developed nations focus on the benefits other 
states can receive from implementing intellectual property laws of 
their own, and that developing nations should in fact accept TRIPS 
not simply because TRIPS had to be implemented if they were to get 
improved access to the developed world' s markets, but because it 
was in their own best interests to do so.114 
A Intellectual Property Protection Laws Make Technology More 
Readily Available 
New technology will not be transfered by its owners unless it can be 
protected by an intellectual property regime. Technological finns are 
reluctant to send their products into nations that will not grant 
intellectual property protection, as they can be reproduced by 
' pirates,' who, because of much lower costs of reproduction 
technology, will be able to put the same product out on the market for 
a much lower price. This disadvantaged position that inventors almost 
invariably suffer means that they will not bother to introduce their 
114 Above n47, 167. 
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product, as they are unlikely to recoup their costs due to the unfair 
competition .115 
As a result, new high-tech products and information will not be as 
readily available in states which do not protect intellectual property. 
The more highly advanced a new invention is, the less likely it is to 
be introduced into a non- patent granting state. The higher the 
research and development costs of a product are, the greater the cost 
discrepency between the 'genuine' invention and the 'pirated' 
invention, and the more the developer has to lose. 
Related problems could include situations where the export markets 
of non-protecting countries could be affected as countries with 
intellectual property protection may forbid the importation of patent-
infringing products, and the active retaliation by intellectual property 
states through the WTO dispute resolution mechanism.1 16 It is 
unlikely that foreign firms will want to develop facilities in a certain 
state if the goods produced there are only good for a single market . A 
facility can produce for the international market only if its goods do 
not infringe the intellectual property laws of the market countries.117 
B Technology Which is Better Suited to Developing Nations Will be 
Produced 
Products geared especially for conditions in developing countries will 
not be produced by Western nations. The products needed by 
developing countries are not necessarily the same as those required 
by developed nations. 
Firms producing goods for a variety of different markets need an 
incentive to make further improvements or adaptations to their 
product so that it better meets the requirements of people living in a 
particular environment. If they are likely to lose money on a product 
in a certain market, there is little reason to introduce it into that 
115 Above n9, 92. 
116 This, however, is not an inherent advantage of supplying intellectual property 
protection , but an effect of the new intellectual property regime. See above n44, 709. 
11
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market, let alone to invest money making it more appropriate for that 
market. Pirating may appropriate the technology, but not necessarily 
the right technology for that environment. 
Indigenous Industry in Non-protechng Nations will Suffer 
Non-protection would have a chilling effect on local industry, 
especially in relation to the development of indigenous technological 
capacity. The lack of patent protection would discourage original 
works because of the fear that patent infringers would prevent 
recouping of invention costs . As a result, scientists and engineers 
would be more likely to leave that country, in search of better 
intellectual property protection. Total technological and scientific 
dependence on other nations would be the likely outcome.11 8 
Even assuming technology would be transfered to a non-protecting 
country, this by itself may not be of much use to a country seeking to 
increase its indigenous technology base. The information needed, not 
merely to reproduce a product, but to improve on it, lean1 from it, and 
alter it to suit local conditions, may not be apparent on its face, and 
often is not found in the patent application itself.11 9 
The best way to gain access to information is education . Locals need 
to work for an institution that allows them access to technological 
infonnation, such as a technologically sophistocated business, a 
university or other institution involved in advanced scientific 
research.120 If there are no indigenous institutions that fit this 
description, local technological culture can be developed by attracting 
foreign high-technology firms .121 Otherwise, the state will have to 
develop its own technological capacity without sharing in the 
existing pool of globally available scientific knowledge, and the 
domestic economy becomes isolated from the inteniational economy, 
denying its citizens the advantages that the inteniational exchange of 
goods and services can provide .122 
118 Above n44, 709. 
119 Above n47, 172. 
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Foreign finns can be brought in by laws thatprotect them from 
employees who leave these finns and use the technological insight 
they gained there in independent, competitive businesses. Without 
them, there will be no employment for technologically sophistocated 
nationals, and no incentives for such nationals to become involved in 
scientific careers. 
Some of the manufacturing steps which add the most value to a 
product are less likely to be performed in a nation with weak patent 
protection. 123 If it is made in such a country, there is no incentive to 
make improvements, as a pirate competitor could just steal it, and if 
manufacturing improvements are not made, a product which might 
have become improved or reduced in price, is not. 
Additionally, if a country does not offer patent protection, if, despite 
the odds, local industry does become the source of innovation, that 
country nms the risk that its inventions will not be eligible for patent 
protection in other states, and its industry will suffer the same losses 
that it has caused other more developed states.124 
Developing Countries will Pay Less for Patented Products Anyway 
The ability of the owners of intellectual property rights to charge for 
the use of their patents, either through royalties or end product prices 
is constrained by the ability of the country granting patent rights to 
pay. 125 Poor countries will pay less for the use of patent rights, and so 
the owner of the patent will have to set the price proportionately 
lower than it would be in wealthier countries. 
123 Above n9, 93 . 
124 See TRIPS, above nl , article 1(3). "Members shall accord the treatment provided for in 
this Agreement to the nationals of all other Members." However, this is more due to the 
existence of TRIPS itself, than a fundamental consequence of the lack of patent 
protection. For example see article 3(1)- "Each Member shall accord to the nationals of 
other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with 
regard to the protection of intellectual property ... " National treatment was required before 
TRIPS. The usage of both principles relies on a state being a party to TRIPS. 
125 Above n47, 177. 
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On top of the benefits to developing nations, the international 
community as a whole benefits from minimum standards of 
intellectual property protection , as the free-rider disincentives to 
innovate are eliminated from all markets, increasing the supply of 
inventions.126 In other words, the justification of intellectual property 
regimes in a domestic environment also operates on a world-wide 
scale. 
For example, in relation to phannaceuticals, the dilemma for the 
pirating nations of the third world is whether to leave the cost of 
development of new, and potentially vital, drugs to the developed 
world, and thereby make currently available pharmaceuticals cheaper 
for their own citizens, or to provide patent protection, and avoid the 
disincentive that would otherwise occur. If free riders are prevented 
from copying, the incentive to invest in development is protected. 
An inten1ational patent system therefore is justifiable if the ratio of 
patent induced inventions to non-patent induced inventions is high 
enough to ensure an overall benefit to the international community! 27 
Is the recognition of further nations of intellectual property ' rights ' 
actually a greater incentive to produce? Will this marginal increase in 
incentive result in an equivalent increase in investment in research 
and development? Will the global community actually benefit from 
new products that would otherwise not have come into being? 28 
THE RESPONSE OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS 
The third world argues that the imposition of minimum intellectual 
property standards disadvantages the poorer citizens of the 
inten1ational community. There are three main arguments made by 
lesser developed nations supporting their weak intellectual property 
protection .129 Firstly, lack of intellectual property protection saves a 
country money. Secondly, it promotes local industry. Thirdly, lack of 
intellectual property protection helps developing countries acquire 
126 Above n83 , 379. 
127 Above n56, 443 . 
118 Above n56, 443-444 . 
129 Above n44, 711. 
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new technologies, lessening third world dependency on industrialised 
countries. Most of these propositions are in direct contrast with 
assertions made by the nations of the developed world. 
A Countries Save Money by Refusing to Protect intellectual Property 
If the grant of patent monopolies was non-compulsory, the cost of 
acquiring and introducing new technology into developing nations 
would be lower, making technology cheaper and more accessible to 
the citizens of the third world. 130 Having no patent system is a good 
way to enjoy the technology of other states without having to pay for 
research and development yourself, especially if the other states still 
grant patents to your nationals .131 
A counterargument to this is that it is based on a false assumption. 
Monopoly 'rents ' -that is the difference between what the public is 
willing to pay for the invention, and the higher price that is ach1a1ly 
charged so that development costs can be recouped by the 
inventor
132 
- are included in the price charged by patent holders; if 
patents were abolished, then costs would decrease as the monopoly 
rent will no longer be part of the price . 
Is this a false assumption? Perhaps not, although pirates may charge 
the same price as the owners of intellectual property rights, they are 
unlikely to, because when 'genuine ' and pirated goods are competing 
in the same markets, the pirates wi11 want, and be able to price 
themselves more competitively than other products, as a ' rent ' does 
not have to be charged. To make their argument, the developed world 
needs to prove that if the citizens of developing countries were 
130 
Above n9, 92 . This is of course assuming that the arguments of developed nations were 
incorrect, and that technology would reach countries that offered little or no intellectual 
property protection. 
131 
For example, when Switzerland and the Netherlands had no patent laws ( 1869-1912 in 
the Netherlands, and 1850-1907 in Switzerland), Dutch and Swiss nationals were able to 
apply for patents in other countries, which they did in significant numbers. There seemed 
to be no decrease in the amount of creative and innovative output during these periods. 
See above n47, 170-171 . 
132 Above n56, 445. 
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prevented from buying cheaper, pirated products, they would still 
want to, and be able to, purchase the item at its full retail price.133 
Developing countries who do grant patent protection usually suffer 
from an initial drop in the number of products on the market, and then 
from a subsequent increase in price. In the case of pharmaceuticals, 
and biotechnical products, these items are ones that are often 
necessary for the health and social welfare of their citizens. 
Of course, this argument is based on the premise that inte11ectual 
property necessarily creates monopoly rents . This may not be so for 
all products, but in the biotechnology and phannaceutical industries, 
where research and development costs are often enormous, inventors 
will, out of economic necessity, be forced to charge intellectual 
property 'rent' or risk making a loss once their product is in the 
market. 134 
Non-protection Promotes Local Industry 
Patents are granted primarily to foreigners .135 A fundamental 
difference between developed and lesser-developed countries is that 
the latter do not generally have the history of inte11ectua1 property 
protection that developed nations do. As a result, these systems are 
perceived as nmning contrary to their own legal histories and being 
imposed primarily to safeguard foreign interests at the expense of 
their own citizens. 
Domestic innovation in a country that does not have an advanced 
technological infrastntcture, and does not have the vast amount of 
investment capital behind it that western industries do, is often limited 
133 Above n34, 12. 
134 
This argument does reinforce the premise put forward by developed nations that weak 
or non-existant intellectual property protection in a particular country makes it unlikely 
that inventors will introduce their products into that domestic market, as they are unlikely 
to recoup their development costs if their product is in competition with pirated goods 
which can price themselves more competitively. However, the non-inclusion of rent would 
make products more cheaply available. 
135 
K Paterson "Recent Intellectual Property Trends in Developing Countries" (1992) 33 
Harvard Int'I LJ 277, 280. 
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to making incremental changes to existing technology. Few of these 
products would meet the standards of novelty or non-obviousness 
required by TRIPS.136 
The beneficiaries of inte11ectua1 property protection are developed 
nations, as it is largely foreign investors to whom patents are granted, 
those producing more protectable goods as a result of their more 
advanced technical knowledge, and the greater amount of capital 
which they are able to dedicate to scientific research. The costs of the 
of intellectual property laws are borne by domestic consumers, and 
the governments which have to implement them. 
Having intellectual property owned by foreign finns prevents 
domestic industry using this technology, whereas piracy stimulates 
domestic production, enhancing competitiveness and economic 
development. 137 
The developed nations ' argument that technology is unlikely to be 
worked in a country that does not protect the inventor ' s right to 
exclusive use, is based on an assumption that patent owners are 
willing to transfer the necessary technology to that country in the first 
place. However, the primary motive for obtaining patent rights in 
developing countries is not so that the product can be protected while 
it is being manufactured in that country, but to preserve a potentially 
important market by means of a patent.138 Technology will only be 
locally worked if this confers some economic benefit on the 
manufacturer, such as cheaper labour costs, readily available local 
materials or an advantageous local market size. 
The non-recognition of inte11ectual property rights seems to be more 
of a growth stimulus than their recognition, however. For example, 
Japan and China have experienced rapid economic growth, because 
at particular stages of their industrial development they liberally made 
unauthorised use of the technology of other countries. Additionally, 
136 
D Brenner-Beck "Do As I Say, Not As I Did" (1 992) 11 UCLA Pac. Basin LJ 84, 97. 
137 Above n135, 280. 
138 Above n56, 451 . 
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the same could be said of America, where the same thing was done in 
the 19th century .139 
C Lack of Intellectual Property Protection Helps Developing Nations 
Acquire New Technologies 
It is difficult to see how developing nations will benefit from TRIPS, 
unless its implementation results in an increased investment and 
technology transfer to them. There is no proven relationship between 
the strength of intellectual property protection in a country and direct 
investment. 140 TRIPS assumes that developing countries are 
consumers of technology, as it protects an import monopoly for 
patent holders, who overwhehningly tend to be citizens or 
corporations from industrialised nations, but contains little incentive 
for local working or adaptation for the local market. 
The protection of foreign intellectual property prevents the 
acquisition of technology by developing countries, and therefore there 
should be a freedom to copy needed products. The need for ready 
access to patented goods, at lower prices, makes intellectual property 
protection a burden on development. Developing countries do not 
want to allocate scarce resources to the implementation and 
enforcement of intellectual property laws. 
Developing countries want the right to grant the local finns of their 
choice the right to use foreign patents which have not been 'worked' 
in their jurisdiction within a specified period of time. There is the fear 
also that foreign companies will exploit citizens by charging full 
prices for goods made elsewhere, while preventing similar goods 
from being locally produced.141 
The above argument is based on the assumption that all worthwhile 
technology comes from outside a country, and the non-protection of 
139 Above n34, 16. 
140 Above n56, 459. 
141 MA Leaffer "Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New 
Multilateralism" (1991) 76 Iowa L Rev. 273 , 286. 
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intellectual property will make the technology available to the 
appropriate groups. 142 
The conclusion is that it is not in the interests of developing nations to 
adopt an intellectual property regime. What is needed is not a strict 
minimum standard of patent protection, but intellectual property 
systems that are more flexible, and that stimulate domestic industries 
and investment in sub-patentable innovation at a local level, so that 
technological infrastructure can reach a stage of development where 
intellectual property protection is in fact economically feasible. 143 
D Are These Countries Really Free-riders:? 
The need for flexibility is especially compelling when it cannot be 
proven, in relation to a particular country, that the underlying purpose 
for adopting an intellectual property regime is being acheived. Are 
new products being created through the additional incentive created 
by the expansion of patent protection to the entire global 
marketplace? If a country did not provide any incentive for the 
production of goods in the first place, how can that country be 
described as a free rider? 
If the domestic market of a developing country played no part in an 
inventor's decision to create a product, the profit and control which 
he or she expected to receive for and over that product was not 
calculated with that country in mind, and should not necessarily 
become part of the profit equation after the fact of invention. 
Marginal countries, by offering intellectual property protection in 
order to comply with the WTO are paying for products that they 
otherwise would have had free. 144 
E How to Make 'Incentive' More Effective in Developing Countries 
One solution may be to decrease the scope of patent protection 
guaranteed by TRIPS. The broader the scope of intellectual property 
142 Above n44, 712-713 . 
143 Above n83, 372. 
144 Above n56, 445 . 
46 
protection, the less incentive there is to make improvements on a 
product.
145 
That is, it becomes more difficult to 'invent around' a 
patent. A world-wide market would provide greater incentive if 
products could be adapted slightly to suit the needs of citizens in 
different countries. 146 Then the patent protection offered by 
developing countries would more likely be a source of incentive to 
product developers. 
However, 'adapted' inventions will not be protected under the TRIPS 
Agreement, even though consumers of phannaceutical products in 
particular, would benefit from a more flexible system which allowed 
scientists to adapt an already patented drug to meet the health 
conditions of a different climate and receive a patent for the adapted 
or improved product. 
Patents granted on pharmaceutical products tend to be unusually 
strong, however, and are often difficult to 'invent around' as patents 
can be granted for an actual molecule, including its analogs, so that 
the patent gives exclusive control over the molecule's recognised 
functional equivalents.147 To truly make the most of the potential 
incentives that TRIPS could provide for inventors, the scope of patent 
protection should be drawn more namowly, so that there would be a 
race to improve existing products, and so products would be tailored 
for different markets. 
If this is not done, TRIPS merely ensures that the high-technology 
corporations of the West obtain the maximum profit from their 
research and development. Fair enough, but when there are only two 
globally accepted justifications for protecting intellectual property, 
scientific development and ensuing economic gain, if the protecton of 
patents by developing countries neither provides an incentive for 
production, nor provides them with any economic benefit, it looks as 
145 Above n56, 447. 
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For example, in Japan, where patent protection has traditionally been very narrow, once 
a patent was filed, it was common practice for competitors to begin to develop 
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n56, 447. 
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if Western rights theories are being imposed through a trade 
mechanism. 
X THE TRIPS PARADIGM EXCLUDES THE TYPE OF 
'TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE' USUALLY POSSESSED BY 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The motivations behind developing countries' increasing acceptence 
of the concept of 'intellectual property' and property rights in 
biological material are different from those of the developed nations. 
A Current interest in Indigenous Knowledge 
Industrial research by pharmaceutical interests has been recently 
increasingly focused on rain forests and natural resources, typically 
sourced from third world countries, for basic production materials. 
'Natural' pharmaceuticals, such as medicinal plants, are of new 
importance due to two factors . The yield of synthetic chemistry is 
decreasing, as the molecules which are easiest to synthesise and 
reproduce have already been created and tested. Additionally, 
advanced research into plant materials has become more viable, as 
new techniques in molecular biology allow more efficient screening 
of plant matter. 148 
Accompanying this attention to natural sources for pharmaceuticals, 
is a new interest in indigenous traditional knowledge as to possible 
uses for these materials. This traditional knowledge, which is of 
increasing importance to the development of new products, is not 
covered by the TRIPS Agreement. 
B This Knowledge is not Protectable under TRIPS 
In recent years it has been suggested that intellectual property rights 
relating to products developed in reliance on indigenous knowledge 
be shared with the governments or citizens of that country.149 The 
148 Above nl35, at 282. 
149See MJ Huft "Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research: A Question of 
Intellectual Property Rights" (1995) 89 NW Uni . L. Rev. 1678, 1685 . 
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problem arises due to the fact that knowledge of this kind is difficult 
to fit within the standard categories of Western intellectual property, 
or meet its requirements . For example, indigenous knowledge often 
belongs to a group, rather than an individual or a corporation and is 
generally not patentable. In contrast to the inventions of a commercial 
or academic research unit, the cultural knowledge of a tribal or 
indigenous group is not patentable, as it is considered public 
knowledge.150 Under Article 27 of the Agreement, traditional 
indigenous knowledge would have difficulties in that it is not "new". 
For example, one patent which caused major controversy was for the 
natural pesticide obtained from the seeds of the Neem tree, which is 
native to India and Bunna. Indians have traditionally used the Neem 
seeds as an antiseptic and an insect-repellant. In the 1980' s, the 
agricultural chemical company W.R . Grace began investigating the 
potential of azadirachtin , the pesticidal substance extractable from the 
Neem seeds. 151 
Grace ' s problem was how to obtain a patent for such a pesticide.The 
complex chemical structure of azadirachtin meant that the traditional 
methods of avoiding the natural substance exception in patent law, 
such as producing a synthetic substitute or purification, were 
unavailable for economic reasons . Instead, Grace focused on 
ameliorating azadirachtin' s major weakness, its instability in solution. 
In 1989, Grace obtained a patent detailing how, if the pH of 
azadirachtin was adjusted in an aqueous ethanol solution, its stability 
increased dramatically. 152 
One of the main grounds on which Indian nationals opposed the grant 
of this patent was the fact that the subject matter was not novel , as its 
use as a pesticide was already known by Indian fanners . However, 
the stabilization of the azadirachtin was found to be sufficiently novel 
to meet the requirements of American patent law, as increasing the 
storage life of the pesticide once it had been removed from its natural 
150 Above nl35, 285 . 
151 Above n9, 88-89 . 
152 Above n9, 89 . 
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source, made the product useful to western farmers, who were 
unable to obtain fresh Neem seeds.153 
The govenunents of the developing world are increasingly aware of 
the value of their genetic resources, and are taking steps to ensure 
that what they perceive are their rights are protected. For example, 
the Manila Declaration Concerning the Ethical Utilisation of Asian 
Biological Resources was produced by scientists from 38 countries 
attending a symposium in the Philippines.154 The Declaration states 
that developing countries, as well as being the source of many of the 
natural ingredients used in drugs, often provide the key to the proper 
and full exploitation of these resources, namely, their national 
traditional knowledge. Developing countries maintain the role of this 
knowledge has been insufficiently recognised, and the current 
methods of exploitation of both local resources and knowledge are 
inequitable, and favour industrialised countries. 
Traditionally, indigenous people did not view their knowledge in 
terms of property at all, but its increasing exploitation by the nations 
of the developed world has resulted in demands for compensation,1 55 
usually in the form of intellectual property rights. The problem 
however, is bringing indigenous expertise within a model developed 
exclusively in the countries of the West, and based on an entirely 
different conception of what property achially is. 
XI PIRACY CAN EVENTUALLY MAKE PATENT PROTECTION 
PROFITABLE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The benefits that can be gained from intellectual property protection 
often depend on a nation' s state of development. As a nation 
advances technologically, it reaches a threshold where the long term 
costs of non-protection156 begin to be outweighed by the benefits a 
patent system can bring.157 It is only the fact of a developed 
153 Above n9, 90 . 
154 The Seventh Asian Symposium on Medicinal Plants and Spices (ASOMPS VII) . See 
above n149, 1692. 
155 Above n149, 1694. 
156 The short term benefits of piracy are not really in any doubt. 
157 Above n136, 102. 
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infrastn1cture that allows a country to benefit from intellectual 
property protection . 
The advantages of intellectual property systems, esJX)used by the 
developed nations of the world, such as technology transfer, 
increased foreign investment in a country's production industries and 
increased incentive for domestic innovation, are not just dependent on 
a system of intellectual property being put into place. A country will 
also need an educated workforce, developed roads, and an advanced 
c01rununications network, as this will be just as, if not more 
attractive, to those individuals and corporations, both foreign and 
domestic, who wish to become involved in technological production 
and innovation within that country. 
The question now becomes, does an intellectual property regime help 
or hinder a developing country when it is attempting to develop this 
initial infrastn1cture? Is a country more likely to reach a high level of 
technological development with or without intellectual property 
protection? The development of a country's scientific infrastn1cture to 
the stage where it will be able to benefit from intellectual property 
laws is often reached with the help of non-protection, that is, piracy . 
The Indian Example 
An example of how piracy can lead to a more advanced level of 
technological development within a country is the Indian treatment of 
phannaceuticals. After India became independent in 194 7, reviews 
were made of its patent system, and whether or not it was operating 
in the best interests of the Indian public.158 It was discovered that 80-
90% of patents granted were held by foreigners , and that more than 
90% were not worked in India itself. 159 Vital industries like food, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals were being monopolised by foreign 
interests, who were pricing these goods at levels virtually 
unaffordable to local consumers. 
158 MJ Aldelman & S Baldia "Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPS 
Agreement: The Case oflndia" (1996) 29 Vand J Transnat'I L 507, 518 . 
159 Above n158, 518. 
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As a result of these investigations, when India passed its 1970 
amendment of the Patents Act,160 it was different from previous 
intellectual property legilation, modeled on English intellectual 
property regulations in that it was not only designed to encourage 
innovation, but "to secure that the inventions are worked in India on a 
conunercial scale" 16 1 and that patents were "not granted merely to 
enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the 
patented article. " 162 
What was arguably the most fundamental change brought about by 
this amendment was the abolition from Indian law of the patent 
protection of food, medicines, dn1gs or any substance produced by a 
chemical process. 163 As a result, the Indian pharmaceutical industry 
has seen one of the most rapid growth rates since independence. It 
has leapt from producing c. 100 million rupees in 194 7 to 70 billion 
ntpees in 1994-1995.164 The 100 million rupees from 1947 was 
basically generated by the processing and compounding of imported 
drugs for making formulations . This is no longer the case, as Indian-
manufactured drugs not only dominate the domestic market, but are 
fiercely competitive internationally as well . 
This expansion is the direct result of the protection that Indian 
pharmaceutical producers have been given by their government 
against foreign competition.165 The patent scheme, in particular has 
shifted the balance in favour of domestic manufacturers . Indian 
corporations had access to foreign pharmaceutical inventions, could 
then re-engineer them, and sell them in the domestic market! 66 Not 
only did this make locally produced goods extremely competitve 
price-wise, it encouraged the development of technological skills, 
such as process-engineering, for Indian nationals, and the 
160 The Patents Act, 1970, No . 39 (1970) (India) . 
161 The Patents Act, above, section 83(a) . 
162 The Patents Act, section 83(b). 
163 However, process claims covering methods of their manufacture were still patentable. 
See section 5(a) and (b) . 
164 Above nl 58, 525 . 
165 Such as high tariffs, regulatory controls, foreign equity restrictions, price controls, and 
virtually no patent protection. 
166 Above nl58, 527. 
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establishment of a complete domestic phannaceutical manufacturing 
capability. 
Additionally, the strength of the competion between domestic 
producers forced Indian producers to look to the export market, 
where Indian pharmaceutical products became very competitive.167 
This fierce competitiveness is mainly due to the low expenditure by 
Indian companies on research and development.168 
While the question could be asked: what has India contributed to the 
development of new drugs, and the advancement of pharmaceutical 
knowledge in general, this is perhaps not the point. The point is that 
India is now in a position where it can make such contributions, 
whereas if it had not protected its pharmaceutical industry through the 
non-protection of pharmaceutical patents, it would have not, either 
now or previously, been in a position to do so . 
Today, Indian phannaceutical manufachlfers are beginning to move 
away from the mass production of more generic drugs and increasing 
their involvement in the research and development of new products . 
This is mainly being done through joint ventures with major foreign 
companies, who, have been brought in by the technological 
capabilities of Indian manufacturers, and the strength of their 
domestic scientific infrastn1chlfe, rather than their intellectual 
property laws . 
India is now in a position where it can benefit from the strong patent 
protection standards that it must impose under the TRIPS Agreement. 
It is attracting a lot of foreign investment, and its producers are 
putting increasing focus on diseases of local importance. However, it 
would probably not be able to do these things if it had not, for a 
substantial amount of time, protected its manufacturers and 
consumers, through the non-protection of patents.169 
167 In the last ten years, the Indian pharmaceutical export market has been gowing at c. 
35% anually. See above nl 58, 527. 
168 Above n83 , 379. 
169 This argument, from the opposite perspective, could be made about the Italian 
pharmaceutical industry. It implemented strong intellectual property protection regulations 
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The Effect of Patent Protection on a Country Depends on its Level 
of Development 
The imposition of intellectual property laws will affect different 
countries differently. Developing countries can be placed into three 
broad categories, which will arguably determine the desirability of 
intellectual property protection :170 
Newly industrialised countries 
Countries such as the Republic of Korea, Singapore Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Thailand have experienced rapid growth in their export of 
technological and electronic products -the result of a relatively high 
inflow of investment capital and technology transfer. 
Larger developing countries 
These larger countries have experienced fairly high levels of 
technology transfer, both from inten1ational corporations and from 
licensing of foreign technology by nationally-owned enterprises, 
including state-owned corporations. Examples include Argentina, 
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and Mexico. 
Smaller developing countries 
Other developing countries which do not fit within the two previous 
categories have had relatively limited technology transfer and 
absorption . These are the countries most unlikely to benefit from the 
imposition of intellectual property laws, as the chances for foreign 
investment, technology transfer and local innovations that are able to 
be protected by patents, become more limited the less technologically 
developed a country is in the first place. The first two groups of 
countries are in a better position to benefit, as they already have 
relatively advanced technological infrastruch1res in place . 
in 1978, and so far has failed to attract the same amount of foreign investment interest that 
India has . See above n83 , 380. 
170 Above n44, 710. 
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Although standardisation of intellectual property laws has the 
advantage of unifonnity and therefore certainty, it prevents refonn 
and adaptation of intellectual property laws on an individual basis 
with a view to what will most benefit a particular nation . The 
concen1s of cmmtries of more or less equal development status are 
being met by the TRIPS Agreement.171 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights is at first glance lacking in obvious 'norms' in 
relation to the imposition of intellectual property rights, it is in fact a 
nonnative, Western document. It was introduced by Western 
governments, and is modeled on legislation from industrialised 
nations. The normative nahire of the Agreement is more apparent, 
when the failure of its economic justifications in relation to many 
WTO members is observed, and its incapability of protecting 
common types of intellectual property, such as indigenous tribal 
knowledge found in developing countries, while it protects 
infonnation that only developed countries have traditionally 
acknowledged as 'protectable '. 
TRIPS is seemingly justified on economic tenns, but it only delivers 
benefits to countries in a relatively advanced stage of scientific and 
economic development. For those countries who have not yet reached 
this stage, the justifications for imposing TRIPS in the first place 
begin to break down . Should a global system have been imposed if it 
only benefits a certain type of country? 
Lesser-developed nations need access to Western intellech1al goods 
for their development, and to have stringent standards of patent 
protection imposed on them may be debilitating. However, 
intellechial property protection issues cannot be ignored by the 
international community. If creators do not recover their investment 
171 Above n71 , 133 . 
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costs, the goal of free trade is undermined, as the result is lower 
production and fewer trading opportunities. 
To be effective, TRIPS must try to reconcile the needs of both 
industrialised and developing nations. Arguably, TRIPS could be 
more inclusive of the needs of a greater number of nations if its scope 
of the protection was narrowed. This would increase the amount of 
incentive it provides, as well as establishing a lower threshold which 
could be more easily reached by producers in developing countries, 
and would enable manufacturers to 'adapt' products for the markets 
of developing countries. 
If TRIPS is not made suitable for all members of the WTO it risks 
being viewed as a mechanism created to prevent competition by low-
cost local producers, rather than being designed to prevent trade 
distortions . 
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